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justify his actions as not being discriminatory. Finally, it would seem reasonable to require a greater precision and' certainty of proof when an action is
brought against a private person than when brought against the state.
The conflict between free choice and equality which is created by the enactment and the enforcement of anti-discrimination measures will exist as long as
racial, religious, and other forms of group prejudices endure in our society.
While the fact that discrimination is not susceptible of certain proof may
heighten this conflict, a judicious establishment of the requirements of proof
and a skillful manipulation of the burdens created by these requirements may
serve to prevent the engulfing of either ideal by the other.

DETERMINATION OF JUST COMPENSATION
IN A CONTROLLED MARKET
When private property is taken for public use, the usual measure of "just
compensation"' is "market value." 2 The justice of this measure in a free market appears manifest: "These market values, being the result of competitive
purchase by persons free to utilize purchasing power as they please, may be
accepted as measuring roughly the relative importance (for the community)
of physical units of different things." 3
However, when the government requisitions commodities in wartime, the
adequacy of the normal rule is challenged by three different market situations.
First, the wartime market reflects "unusual" economic circumstances involving "abnormal" conditions of supply and demand, and it may be argued
that these abnormalities should be recognized in a court's finding of just compensation. In C. G. Blake Co. v. United States,4 a case arising out of World
War I, the government maintained that "on account of abnormal conditions,
resulting from the war ... there was no true or fair market, and no such thing
as fair market value ....-5The court held, however, that "fair market value"
does not necessarily mean value in "a market in which the supply about equals
the demand, and in which conditions might be termed fairly normal .... 6
Such wartime economic abnormalities provide no greater reason to suspend
the market value rule than comparable abnormalities in peacetime:

I "...

nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation."

U.S. Const. Amend. 5.

The phrases "market value" and "just compensation" have been used interchangeably to
such a degree that Nichols declares, "Market value, and market value alone, is the universal
test." r Nichols, Eminent Domain 663 (2d ed. 1917); see 2 Lewis, Eminent Domain § 7o6
(3d ed. i9o9). The current view is that "market value is simple the ordinary test, to be rejected
in those exceptional cases where it would not constitute 'just compensation.'" Orgel, Valuation Under Eminent Domain 6o (1936).
3
Simons, Economic Policy for a Free Society 46 (1948).
4275 Fed. 86i (D. C. Ohio, 1921).
sIbid., at 862.
6Ibid., at 866.
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Drouths, floods, commercial panics, crop failures, labor difficulties, and other causes
frequently affect markets seriously, but not so as to warrant a court, when assessing
compensation consequent upon the exercise of the right of eminent domain, in saying
that there is no market. The effects of war may differ in degree, but, so long as a
market-that is, a general buying and selling of the commodity-exists, the rule
persists. 7

If market value is just compensation because it is the measure of value
freely arrived at by the community in the course of competitive buying and
selling, the result of the Blake case surely follows.

8

The second and third wartime challenges to the market value rule arose in
the recent war because the characteristic market situation was not one in which
price was competitively determined. Either the commodities taken were subject to government price control under OPA regulations; or, because of their
peculiar importance to war production, the commodities taken were subject
to stringent government market controls which effected virtual suspension of
trade in normal volume. In the former case, it was urged that the rationale
of the market value rule, based on the assumption of a free market, could not
be applied to the OPA ceiling price; in the latter situation, it was argued that
there was simply no market price to turn to.
The Supreme Court has never ruled squarely on the question whether a
ceiling price constitutes just compensation. In United States v. Felin & Co.,
Inc.,9 Justice Reed, in a concurring opinion, characterized the constitutionally
established ceiling price as "the only relevant measure of just compensation."' °
Joined by Justices Black and Murphy, he argued that the government could
constitutionally require owners of this perishable property either to sell at the
fixed price or not to sell at all. "If the Government fixed prices with the predominant purpose of acquiring property affected by its order, a different situation would be presented." ' But here was price regulation affecting buying
7

Ibid., at 864. Insofar as the Blake case indicated that the courts should disregard govern-

ment regulations and priorities in fixing just compensation in wartime, the Circuit Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit expressly refused to follow it in a case involving the valuation
of land. United States v. Delano Park Homes, Inc., 146 F. 2d 473, 474 (C.C.A. 2d, x944).
8 The Supreme Court approved this line of reasoning in United States v. New River Collieries Co., 262 U.S. 341 (1923). No case in the recent war appears to have challenged the
market value rule solely on the basis of alleged economic abnormalities. Having imposed direct
economic controls earlier and on a broader scale than in World War I, the government has
argued that the various prices prevailing under such controls were the measures of just compensation for commodities taken.
9
33 4 U.S. 624 (1948). In World War I, the prevailing price for copper fixed and enforced by
the government in cooperation with copper processors was held by the Supreme Court to be
just compensation for copper requisitioned by the government, when the owner had actively
assisted in setting the price and enforcing compliance. Vogelstein & Co., Inc. v. United States,
262 U.S. 337 (1923).
'o334 U.S. 624, 646 (1948). Justice Reed cites Vogelstein & Co., Inc. v. United States, 262
U.S. 337 (1923), as authority for the statement that the "prevailing price in a controlled
market was 'just compensation.'" 334 U.S. 624, 645 (1948).
1 United States v. Felin & Co., Inc., 334 U.S. 624, 646 (1948).
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and selling on a national scale. To require the government in this situation to
pay a higher price for requisitioned property than that legally obtainable from
the general public would be "anomalous,"' 23 especially when the regulations
were themselves subject to judicial review.'
Justice Frankfurter, joined by the Chief Justice and Justice Burton in the
majority opinion, upheld the government's award of ceiling price as just compensation on other grounds. The majority declared that the burden was upon
the complainant to prove that the original government award was less than
just compensation, and that, since it had not done so, the Court need not consider the controversial question as to whether a fixed market price was of itself
just compensation.' 4 As to that question, however, Justice Frankfurter indicated disagreement with the Reed view that controlled selling price was just
compensation because it was the maximum price legally obtainable in the prevailing market. 15 While market price is the conventional criterion, ". . there
must be a market to make the criterion available. Here there was a market...
market; it was controlled in its vital feature,
but it was not a free and open
6
selling price, by the OPA."'
In a second concurring opinion, Justice Rutledge, remarking that the Reed
view "may be" correct in the case of highly perishable property, held that the
ceiling price itself furnished at least a presumptive measure of just compensation which must be allowed to stand in the present case, the complainant
7
not having overcome the presumption with a showing of compensable loss.'
Justices Jackson and Douglas dissented:
[Mlarket price, as such, is not controlling. The Fifth Amendment's "exact limitation
on the power of the Government" is not market price-it is just compensation. The
former is relevant, and this Court has so considered it, only8because, in a free market,
it is perhaps the best key to value at the time of taking.'
The dissent believed that if the ceiling price were found to be just compensation in this case, it would thereafter be necessary for all ceiling prices to
meet the constitutional requirement of just compensation to be valid.' 9 This
would of course be an intolerable burden upon the administration of price
controls. The purpose of the price control act was "to prevent speculative,
Ibid., at 645.
"3Justice Reed places some emphasis upon the fact that perishable goods were involved in
the Felin case. This leaves open the question whether ceiling price should be the measure of
just compensation for goods the owner might retain without risking spoilage. If an owner of
such goods were to decide to retain his goods until the lifting of ceilings, the ceiling price would
not necessarily be the maximum price legally obtainable. Compare Pantex Pressing Machine,
Inc. v. United States, 71 F. Supp. 859, 862 (Ct. Cl., 1947).
14 United States v. Felin & Co., Inc., 334 U.S. 624, 641 (1948).
15 Ibid., at 63o.
TIbid.
17Ibid., at 647, 648.

1 Ibid., at 652.
9Ibid., at 651.
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unwarranted, and abnormal increases in prices and rents; to eliminate and
prevent profiteering, hoarding, manipulation, speculation, and other disruptive
practises resulting from abnormal market conditions" 20 of wartime; just compensation, on the other hand, has sometimes required an award of "unwar21
ranted" prices in "abnormal" markets.
The Felin case poses the problem. If market price is just compensation
because it is the best measure of value in a free market, some other measure
of value is required when the government enforces a fixed ceiling price. If
market price is just because it is the highest price legally obtainable in the
prevailing market, a government ceiling price qualifies as just compensation,
provided the price has not been fixed with the predominant purpose of acquiring
for public use the property affected. In no case can the ceiling price be defended
as just compensation merely because anything higher would be "abnormal"
according to the standards of a congressional price control act.
If the courts adopt the view which justifies market prices only if there is a
free market, the problem of finding substitute measures of value arises in any
situation in which the market is regulated. The difficulties barring a solution
of this problem appear in a third type of case, where the government requisitions commodities which, because of their importance to the war, have been
placed under close government trading controls. These controls not only restrict the free determination of price as do simple price controls, but, in addition, severely limit the amount of trading in the controlled market. For example, during the recent war the use or sale of aluminum for any but authorized
purposes was forbidden by government order. To channel into essential war
production the goods made idle by this order, the government offered to purchase aluminum inventories at a price that was 75 per cent bf the market
listings, feeling that in the light of the regulations and uncertainties of wartime, such a price was sufficient to induce voluntary sales by the holders of
22
aluminum.
20 Emergency Price Control Act, 56 Stat. 23, 24 (X942). The price control act also sought to
"assure that defense appropriations are not dissipated by excessive prices." Ibid.
21United States v. New River Collieries Co., 262 U.S. 341 (1923); C. G. Blake Co. v. United
States, 275 Fed. 861 (D.C. Ohio, x92i); National City Bank of New York v. United States,
275 Fed. 855 (D.C. N.Y., 1921). However, the owner cannot trade on the necessities of the
government by demanding "strategic value" for his property. United States v. ChandlerDunbar Water Power Co., 229 U.S. 53 (i913); cf. Lawrence v. Boston, i g Mass. X26 (1875).
Nor will the courts recognize a price manipulated by the owner of the property. Lovejoy v.
Michels, 88 Mich. i5, 27, 49 N.W. 9oi, 9o3, 9o4 (i89i); cf. Muser v. Magone, 155 U.S. 240
(1894).
In Walker v. United States, 64 F. Supp. 135, 140 (Ct. Cl., 1946), the Court of Claims disregarded the fundamental distinction in objectives between congressional enactments to control inflation through price ceilings and judicial determinations of value for just compensation
purposes. Without exploring the question as to whether the ceiling price was of itself just compensation, the court said that it was not surprising that just compensation, judicially determined, and ceiling price, administratively fixed, should turn out to be equivalent, "in view of
the statutory basis by which the Administrator was bound."
"Illinois Pure Aluminum Co. v. United States, 67 F. Supp. 955, 957 (Ct. Cl., 1946).
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In Pantex PressingMachine, Inc. v. United States,23 the government argued
that the purchase program price was the measure of just compensation for
requisitioned aluminum. But the Court of Claims held that "the fact that 98
per cent of the holders of aluminum in this country turned over to the Govern24
ment 96 per cent of their holdings at this price.., did not establish a market"
such as would qualify the price as just compensation. In the absence of a determinable market value, the court adopted, as the nominal measure of just
compensation, "retention value," which is described as follows:
While the Government... has the unquestioned right to impose restrictions... nevertheless when it takes a person's property it must compensate him in the light of his
right to retain his property, unless requisitioned until the restrictions on its use and
disposition should be removed. If it is possible to ascertain the market value of the
property at the time of the taking, a plaintiff is entitled to recover this value, less these
carrying charges. This is what the defendant aptly calls "retention value."'2 5
Of course, the inability of the courts to determine "market value of the
property at the time of the taking" is responsible for the confusion in these
cases. After rejecting the various figures suggested by the parties as the proper
"market value" in this case, the court held that the plaintiff was entitled to an
award of cost plus a "fair mark-up for profit." The court concluded, saying,
"There is no testimony covering profit and other expenses and carrying charges,
but we think it fair and equitable to conclude that one would about offset the
other."'26 In effect, then, original cost provided the measure of value in this
27
case.
Once market price is abandoned as the measure of value, it seems clear that
F. Supp. 859 (Ct. Cl., 1947).
at 862. Contra: Lessner Plumbing & Heating Co., Inc. v. United States, 64 F.
Supp. 931, 934 (N.Y., 1945). Compare Graves v. United States, 62 F. Supp. 231, 234 (N.Y.
1945), where just compensation was the "best available market for plaintiffs' property on the
date of the taking" which was the Copper Recovery Program purchase price. Only these two
federal district court cases have upheld such prices as market value. Compare Louisiville
Flying Service, Inc. v. United States, 64 F. Supp. 938 (Ky., 1945).
2' 71

24Ibid.,

25 Pantex Pressing Machine, Inc. v. United States, 7, F. Supp. 859, 862 (Ct. Cl., 1947).
26
27

Ibid., at 863.

It is significant that the court assumed that a substitute measure for market value
should include, in addition to cost, a fair profit. In application of the usual rule, loss of business
good will, or profits, incidental to a taking, are generally held not to be compensable, either on
the ground that such loss is not a part of the value of the property taken, or that such losses are
too speculative to be considered. Orgel, Valuation Under Eminent Domain §§ 71, 74, 75, 76
(1936). In the Blake case, the court denied a cost-plus-reasonable-profit measure suggested
there by the government. It said plaintiff was entitled to a "full and just equivalent," but,
"Cost plus a reasonable profit may be more or less than an equivalent. . ." C. G. Blake Co. v.
United States, 275 Fed. 861, 867 (D.C. Ohio, 2922).
In Neumaticos Goodyear, S.A. v. United States, 73 F. Supp. 969, 972 (Ct. Cl., 2947), just
compensation was found to be the average of many individually computed prices, which had
been paid by the government in its purchases of idle rubber under the Surplus Stocks Program,
plus a "fair mark-up for profit, to which we think it is entitled considering the risk incurred in
the purchase and shipment of the rubber."
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some type of cost figure must be adopted: original cost; out-of-pocket costs
(analogous to reliance damages); cost plus a "fair" mark-up for profit (approximating expectation damages); or replacement cost, as was suggested in
the Felin case. 2 8 The difficulty with replacement cost in most of these wartime
cases is that it may be impossible to replace the requisitioned property at any
price, and the attempt to compute what replacement cost would be may lead a
court into the very type of conjecture which it must seek to avoid. If a court
attempts to use original cost, it will undoubtedly find itself confronted with
several alternative cost figures each based on a different set of accounting
assumptions, and each valid, given its own premises. 29 In any case, a measure
of value based upon cost cannot be as satisfactory a measure as that based upon
market price. To move from price to cost in the determination of value is to
move out of the market place and onto the balance sheet, where the "speculative approximation and guesswork" 30 of cost accountancy reign. A reasonably objective measure is replaced by a relatively subjective one.
The difficulties encountered in determining just compensation from a consideration of such subjective factors can be seen in the failure of the courts
in some cases to articulate the basis of their findings. 31 To avoid these difficulties and preserve the virtues of the market value rule, the court in one case 2
treated the market price prevailing before the imposition of controls as the
value of the property at the time of the taking. Considering the uncertainties
28 Replacement cost was the measure adopted by the Court of Claims. Felin & Co., Inc. v.
United States, 67 F. Supp. 017 (Ct. Cl., 1946). The property involved was a quantity of pork
products. In view of the problem of joint costs in a business producing no single major product,
Justice Frankfurter ruled replacement cost to be a "spurious" measure of value. United States
v. Felin & Co., Inc., 334 U.S. 624, 632, 640 (1948).

29 For example, the cost of inventories m ay be priced under LIFO, FIFO, or averaging
methods of accounting. The costs of identical commodities could thus differ by wide margins,
according to the system employed. When there is a determinable market value, there may be a
great divergence between the cost and value figures. There would probably be even greater
disagreement and confusion over the original cost of "joint-cost" products. See opinion of
Justice Frankfurter in United States v. Felin & Co., Inc., 334 U.S. 624-42 (1948). Compare
Hamilton, Cost as a Standard for Price, 4 Law & Contemp. Prob. 321 (1937).
30 United States v. Felin & Co., Inc., 334 U.S. 624, 634 (1948).
31In Harris & Co. v. United States, 69 F. Supp. 129 (Ct. Cl., 1947), the plaintiff had held a
contract, subsequently cancelled because of government regulations, to sell metal rods at
$5.5o per cwt. Later, when the OPA approval of sales was required, that body allowed a sale of
part of this stock at $3.47 per cwt. An OPA ceiling was then established at $2.75 per cwt. The
"fair and reasonable value" of the rods upon requisitioning was found to be $3.23 per cwt.
Although the court took notice of some deterioration in the metal, it did not reveal the basis
of its figure, which is two-thirds the way from the $2.75 ceiling to the $3.47 authorized selling price.
In Illinois Pure Aluminum Co. v. United States, 67 F. Supp. 955 (Ct. Cl., 1946), the court
found just compensation "from all the facts and the circumstances" of the case to be
$36,420.10, where original cost had been $45,918.07; replacement cost, $42,847.18; the original
government award, based on its purchase program price, $30,781.83; and the plaintiff's claim,
$45,045.25. Again, the basis of this valuation is not revealed.
32Arkansas Valley Ry., Inc. v. United States, 68 F. Supp 727 (Ct. Cl., 1946).
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inherent in the alternative method of cost valuation, can it be conclusively
demonstrated that the last prevailing free price is less satisfactory as a measure
of value?
But an orderly approach to the problem of valuation for just compensation
in a regulated market is possible. The rationale which attempts to explain the
market value rule in terms of competitive buying in a free market should be
abandoned. It is suggested, rather, that under the logic which requires compensation to be "just to the public as well as to the owner,"33 market value
should be viewed as just compensation because it awards the owner the best
price he could obtain for his property in the general market, at the same time
placing a limit on the price which the public (i.e., the government) must pay.
It is also the most objective and most easily determined standard of value.
According to this rule, in a competitive but inflated (or deflated) market, the
measure of just compensation is the prevailing market price, although such
price may seem "abnormally" high (or low) relative to the owner's costs and
his prospective profits (or losses).
This rule should be extended to the controlled market, where the government fixes the ceiling price at which trading may proceed: the prevailing
market price, although probably the ceiling price, is the appropriate measure.
It has never been considered important that a particular market price may
reflect market control by a monopolist.34 If the government should adopt antiinflation market controls in the course of war, the prevailing price in such a
controlled market should be accepted as the appropriate measure of value. It
is an objective standard, provided the predominant purpose of the government
is not to acquire property at the fixed prices. It is easily determined, and it
awards the owner the maximum legal price obtainable for the property, without the necessity of resorting to hypothetical "markets."
The owner may argue that, were it not for the taking, he would have a right
to retain his property until the restrictions were lifted, at which time, presumably, the property could be used or sold to better advantage than presently
possible; and that this right to retain is an element of value to be compensated
for. The answer to this argument is that, since neither the time during which
controls will be continued nor the state of the market at the expiration of controls can be accurately determined, the value of the right to retain is speculative, to say the least. Assuming, however, that the right to retain could be
accurately valued, an award of such value would result in discrimination in
3 C. G. Blake Co. v. United States, 275 Fed. 861, 867 (D.C. Ohio, 1921). Compare the
Second War Powers Act of 1942, which restricted compensation for taking to that which the
Fifth Amendment enjoins. 56 Stat. 176, 181 (1942), 5o App. U.S.C.A. §§ 631, 636a (i944).
34 See Illinois Pure Aluminum Co. v. United States, 67 F. Supp. 955, 957 (Ct. CL., 1946),
where it is said, "For a number of years the market price for aluminum was largely governed
by the price list of the Aluminum Corporation of America, which controls a large part of the
production of aluminum. From this company most of the users of aluminum secured their
supplies." Presumably, absent the wartime regulations, such market price would be just compensation within the terms of the Fifth Amendment.
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favor of those whose property is taken by eminent domain, against those who
35
sold on the market at the fixed ceiling price.
In the Court of Claims, Judge Madden has written, in dissent, a strong argument for treating a fixed market price as the proper measure of just compensation:
The Court holds that the Government... to make just compensation, must pay more
than its valid law would have permitted anyone else to pay. And the evidence on
which the higher price is based is that, before the price was put under control, the
higher price prevailed, and that, in the opinion of an expert, when price control should
have been removed, the higher price would, again, prevail.
This evidence does not seem to me to be helpful. Pecuniary values are the product
of many factors, and, particularly in wartime, some of the most important factors
are the actions of Government.... [T]hese factors are actual, and lawful, and,
I think, should not be disregarded by resort to a hypothetical situation in which they
do not exist. Besides, I think it is inequitable and discriminatory ...to pay the person,
whose property happened to be requisitioned by the Government, more than his
36
fellow, who sold his property in the market, could lawfully charge or accept.
As noted previously, the "lawful actions of Government" in the wartime
market may extend beyond the anti-inflation measures of price-fixing. When
the government prohibits the use or sale of vital materials for any but authorized purposes, and, having thus limited the market, establishes a "program
price" at which it is hoped the goods will voluntarily flow to authorized users,
the proper measure of just compensation under the suggested rationale would
be the program price. This would be true although it be shown that the government had fixed a irice lower than that which prevailed on the free market
immediately before the imposition of controls. The predominant purpose was
not to take the property affected by the controls; it was to establish the least
inflationary price at which transfers of vital goods would expeditiously be made
to authorized war contractors.sr This being so, the price can be said to be a
reasonably objective measure of value; it is easily determined; it awards the

36 In addition, it should be remembered that in establishing price control, Congress provided
means of direct attack upon those ceilings which appeared unjust to affected owners. Compare
Justice Reed's opinion in United States v. Felin & Co., Inc., 334 U.S. 624, 646 (1948). In
United States v. Delano Park Homes, Inc., 146 F. 2d 473, 474 (C.C A. 2d, '944), the issue involved the effect to be given government building priorities in valuing land which the owner
had intended to use in a housing program. Judge L. Hand said, "When competent authority has
fixed prices at a maximum, or has denied owners some specific use of their property, it is
patently a disregard of its authority.., to allow the price to be figured in disregard of the
limitation imposed." It is suggested in OPA Ceiling Prices as Evidence of Value, 6o Harv.
L. Rev. 132, 133 (1946), that the "prohibition of the Act against selling ...in violation of
OPA price regulations might be... applicable to requisitions... since 'selling' is defined to
include 'sales, dispositions, exchanges, leases, and other trafers.'"
36 Arkansas Valley Ry., Inc. v. United States, 68 F. Supp. 727, 731 (1946).
37In case of aluminum, 98 per cent of the holders of aluminum stocks in this country sold
96 per cent of their holdings to the government at such a program price. Pantex Pressing
Machine, Inc. v. United States, 71 F. Supp. 859, 862 (Ct.CI., 1947).
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owner the maximum price legally obtainable in the market; and it avoids confusing expeditions into the realm of cost accountancy.
A final, but unlikely, hypothetical case may be dealt with. Were the government, in a proper situation, to impose unqualified restrictions upon the use or
sale of given property, the value of such property would be zero if the "right
to retain" until the lifting of restrictions were denied. Under the analysis
adopted here, "just compensation" would require the government to pay the
owner no more than the value of the property at the time of taking, i.e., zero.
Before it is objected that such a result would be as unconscionable as the case
would be unlikely, it should be pointed out that the government may, by valid
restrictions, destroy property value and not be required to compensate for such
destruction. For example, the refusal of the government to allocate essential
raw materials to a manufacturing plant (when other manufacturers similarly
situated are receiving allocations) may force a shutdown of the plant. If the
plant has no alternate uses, its entire value is the present value of the prospective earnings after the lifting of the restrictions upon allocation-the value of
the "right to retain." Ignoring this, its present value is zero. There is no question that the closed plant suffers a complete loss of what would be current
profits, as well as out-of-pocket expenses and depreciation charges, for the
time it is forced to remain idle. But "[i]t is not sufficient that damages have
resulted or that hardships have occurred. War inevitably produces hardships,
suffering, and losses, some of which cannot be measured in money. Legitimate
war powers must be exercised, whatever the cost."38 Thus, ". . when governmental powers are legitimately exercised for the public good, and the injury
complained of is only incidental to their exercise, there is no taking of property
for the public use."39
In refusing to compensate for the destruction of the value of a plant's production during the enforcement of restrictions, the courts employ a distinction
between "incidental damages," which cannot be compensated for, and a physical "taking" which must be compensated for. 40 Under the present analysis,
which ignores the value of the right to retain, not only the destruction of value
incidental to the lawful exercise of regulatory powers, but also the direct physical taking of property the value of which has been so destroyed, would be
noncompensable. However, in the extreme case under consideration, where the
"present" value (the only alternative price presently available) is zero, it is
28 St. Regis Paper Co. v. United States, 76 F. Supp. 831, 833 (Ct. Cl., 1948), cert. den. 335
U.S. 815 (1948).

"Morrisdale
9
Coal Co. v. United States, 55 Ct. C1.310, 36 (192o), aff'd 259 U.S. 188 (1922),
quoted in St. Regis Paper Co. v. United States, 76 F. Supp. 831, 833-34 (Ct. Cl. 1948), cert.
den. 335 U.S. 815 (1948).
40A discussion of the concept of "taking" is contained in Cormack, Legal Concepts in
Cases of Eminent Domain, 41 Yale L.J. 22X (193i). It is there urged that if condemnees are
to be fully compensated and the losses inflicted in promoting the "public use" are to be distributed throughout the community, the concept of "taking" must not be restricted to a physical
meaning.
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unlikely that this analysis would be rigorously applied by the courts. In this
case, no more than in the other cases, can the value of the right to retain be
determined. But it seems more probable that nonperishable property will have
some value upon the lifting of controls, and that the controls will be lifted.
The courts would undoubtedly find compensation due in such a case.
The same considerations could be applied to certain cases involving the
government program prices. These prices were not directly reviewable as were
the OPA ceiling prices. Consequently, where the program price is so low as to
amount merely to a fiat price, the resulting situation is essentially the same as
where trading is completely restricted.
If in cases like the above there is to be compensation, its measure should be
free from confusion and easily determinable. In view of the completely speculative nature of retention value, the best rule-of-thumb in such circumstances
would probably be to award the last quoted market price for the property,
whether it be the price of a free or controlled market.

MIGRATORY DIVORCE IN AUSTRALIA AND
THE UNITED STATES
Recent decisions and discussions have emphasized abundantly the acuteness
of the country's interstate divorce problem,' Perhaps a study of the fundamental
aspect of the problem, the theory of "states' rights" to control divorce policy,
coupled with a brief restatement of the uncertainty a "Nevada" decree casts
upon subsequent legal relations of the parties may serve to accentuate its pressing nature as well as the difficulties of achieving a solution. It does not seem
necessary to repeat all that has been said of attempted American solutions and
the reasons for their failure. However, for the purpose of clarifying the American
situation, a rather detailed discussion of the history of interstate divorce in the
Commonwealth of Australia is attempted here. Although, to be sure, the Australian treatment cannot be realistically advanced as a solution for this country,
the differences and similarities of the two legal systems on this problem have
been phrased in terms of possible American adoption of the Australian program.
The strength of this comparative method is founded on similarities between the
legal systems of the two nations. Both spring from the same common law and
are affected insofar as jurisdiction in divorce is concerned by similar constituI Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541 (1948); Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226 (I945);
Llewellyn, Behind the Law of Divorce, 32 Col. L. Rev. 1281 (1932); Powell, And Repent at
Leisure, 58 Harv. L. Rev. 930 (i945); Lenhoff, The Rationale of the Recognition of Foreign
Divorces in New York, i6 Fordham L. Rev. 231 (1947); J. M. Radin, The Interstate Divorce
Problem, 69 N.J. LJ. 233 (1946). For an interesting decision shedding light upon early conflicts problems when states based jurisdiction variously on domicile, place where the cause of
action arose, place of marriage, see Ditson v. Ditson, 4 R.I. 87 (1856). Footnote 13 of Justice
Frankfurter's dissent in Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343, 364 (1948), traces briefly recent
attempts to solve the problem.

